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Conceptual engineering is concerned with the improvement of our concepts. The motivating 
thought behind many such projects is that some of our concepts are defective. But, if to use a 
defective concept is to do something wrong, and if to do something wrong one must be in control 
of what one is doing, there might be no defective concepts, since we typically are not in control 
of our concept use. To address this problem, this paper turns from appraising the concepts we use 
to appraising the people who use them. First, I outline several ways in which the use of a concept 
can violate moral standards. Second, I discuss three accounts of moral responsibility, which I call 
voluntarism, rationalism, and psychologism, arguing that each allows us to find at least some 
cases where we are responsible for using defective concepts. Third, I answer an objection that 
because most of our concepts are acquired through processes for which we are not responsible, 
our use of defective concepts is a matter of bad luck, and not something for which we are 
responsible after all. Finally, I conclude by discussing some of the ways we may hold people 
accountable for using defective concepts. 
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A smart set of concepts may be a most efficient instrument of corruption. 
Iris Murdoch (2013, 32). 
1. Introduction: Conceptual Defects and the Point of Conceptual Engineering 
Conceptual engineering (or conceptual ethics) is characterised as the ‘critical/constructive 
enterprise of assessing and improving our representational devices’ (Cappelen 2018, 3). The 
hope is that we can improve our theories or our societies by improving our concepts. As Sally 
Haslanger puts it in the course of developing ‘ameliorated’ accounts of the concepts GENDER and 
RACE, ‘The responsibility is ours to define [our concepts] for our purposes’ (Haslanger 2012, 
224). 
The idea behind ameliorating our concepts is not merely that some of our concepts work 
reasonably well for our purposes, but could be made even better. Rather, the motivating thought 
behind conceptual engineering is that some of our concepts are defective. As Herman Cappelen 
and David Plunkett outline, such defects include: ‘cognitive defects (that undermine our ability 
                                               
1. I am thankful to all those who offered feedback on those earlier drafts of this paper, especially 
Miranda Fricker, Paul Faulkner, Hallvard Lillehammer, Jennifer Saul, Stephen Laurence, 
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improved the paper. I also owe my gratitude to the University of Sheffield for funding the first 
three years of my PhD (when much of the initial research was completed) and for continuing to 
support my work as an Honorary Research Fellow there, to the Graduate Center of the City 
University of New York for hosting my study visit in the fall of 2017, to Dalhousie University 
and the Banting Postdoctoral Fellowships programme for supporting my current position (when 
this work was completed), and last but not least to my partner, Kat Curwin, for supporting me 
during my unemployment between these two positions. 
to reason properly), moral or political defects (that undermine moral or political values of 
various sorts), theoretical defects (that undermine progress within some theoretical field), or 
semantic defects (where the semantic value is incoherent, incomplete, or missing)’ (Cappelen 
and Plunkett, forthcoming 2019, 2 in ms.). So, conceptual engineering is not just engaged in the 
fine-tuning of abstract machinery; in most cases, the project is an overhaul of, or the construction 
of a replacement for, a defective concept. 
 However, this focus on conceptual defects can give rise to an argument that risks 
undermining the very same motivation for conceptual engineering:2 
No Wrong Concepts 
(1) The claim that motivates conceptual engineering is that some of our concepts are 
defective, and thus in need of ameliorative work. 
(2) To use a defective concept is to do something wrong. 
(3) But, when the agent φ’s, in order for the agent to have done something wrong in φ-
ing, the agent must have been in control of her φ-ing. 
(4) And, our use of particular concepts is not within our control. 
(5) Therefore, no one does anything wrong when they use any concept; and so, 
(6) There can be no defective concepts—and the motivation for conceptual engineering is 
moot. 
There are several ways one could reply to this line of argument. For instance, one could perhaps 
deny (2), and argue that using a defective concept is to do something bad (but not wrong), which 
one might do without any control over what one is doing. The opponent of conceptual 
engineering might push back, however, since the distinction between wrongness and badness is 
not especially clear.3 
                                               
2. I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this argument as a framing device 
for the paper. 
3. Indeed, some philosophers seem to have the opposite intuition about this distinction. Sher, for 
example, refers to ‘the morally defective acts that render agents blameworthy not as wrong acts 
but rather as bad ones’ (Sher 2005, 9). 
 Regardless of the truth of (2) and of the ultimate conclusion of No Wrong Concepts, 
however, the argument also raises a pressing and unexplored problem for conceptual 
engineering: given that an agent has used a defective concept, how should we appraise her? Can 
we hold her responsible for using a defective concept? If (3) and (4) are true, independently of 
the rest of the argument, then it follows that no one is ever responsible for using defective 
concepts. And from this, it would seem to follow that we may never hold anyone responsible for 
using defective concepts. For it is a widely-accepted principle that an agent may be held 
responsible—that is to say, blamed, punished, criticised, or otherwise held accountable—only 
for those things that she is responsible for. 
 Undermining the possibility that anyone is ever responsible for using a defective concept 
is less devastating for conceptual engineering than the possibility that there are no defective 
concepts at all. But conceptual engineering would still be hamstringed in its practical purpose. 
Part of the practical point of conceptual engineering is to get people to actually use better 
concepts, but if no one is ever responsible for using defective concepts, then the only permitted 
approach would be to make exhortations in favour of the ameliorated concepts, while reserving 
judgement on the people who continue to use defective concepts. We would never be permitted 
to hold them accountable for doing so—even when the concepts they use are central components 
of factually mistaken or morally abhorrent views. 
 In order to defeat No Wrong Concepts and to establish the notion of conceptual 
responsibility, the method I will take in this paper is to argue as follows. First, (4) is false—
sometimes we are in control of the concepts we use. Second, and more significantly, (3) is false—
control is not a necessary condition for responsibility. In the background of (3) is a familiar 
theory of responsibility that is based on the idea that we are only responsible for the things that 
we voluntarily bring about. But this kind of account is questionable independently of the upshot 
for conceptual engineering. The ensuing discussion will show not just that some concepts are 
indeed defective, but also that we are often responsible for using them, and, thus, may be held 
accountable for doing so. Third and finally, there are some situations where, even though we are 
not responsible for something, we may still be held accountable for it, in that we may be asked to 
take responsibility for it. 
 Here, more precisely, is the plan. In §2, I survey several plausible examples of defective 
concepts. To focus the discussion of responsibility that follows, I concentrate on cases of morally 
defective concepts. In §§3–5, I discuss several theories of moral responsibility—which I call 
voluntarism, rationalism, and psychologism—in order to uncover the conditions under which one 
might be responsible for using a concept. While I argue in favour of the third of these views, 
each account admits at least some cases where the agent is responsible for using a concept; 
indeed, the latter two admit a significant range of cases. In §6, I reply to an objection that, 
regardless of one’s theory of responsibility, the fact that much of one’s conceptual repertoire is 
acquired through processes that are merely a matter of luck entails that one is never responsible 
for using a defective concept. In §7, having shown that we can be responsible for using defective 
concepts, I close by briefly discussing some of the ways in which we might hold people 
accountable for doing so, whether the concepts’ defects are moral or of some other domain. 
2. Conceptual Wrongs 
To focus the discussion, it will be helpful to have several cases of defective concepts to return to 
in the following sections. I will concentrate on ways in which concepts can be morally defective 
in this paper, as it streamlines the discussion of responsibility to follow. (I briefly discuss 
cognitively, theoretically, and semantically defective concepts, and whether we might be 
responsible for using them, towards the end of the paper.) 
 One way a concept can be morally defective is when the very category it picks out is 
injurious. Consider, for instance, what Charles Mills says about the concept of a ‘savage’ as 
applied to indigenous people: 
the nonwhite Other is grasped through a historic array of concepts whose common 
denominator is their subjects’ location on a lower ontological and moral rung...When 
Thomas Jefferson excoriates the ‘merciless Indian Savages’ in the Declaration of 
Independence...neither he nor his readers will experience any cognitive dissonance with 
the earlier claims about the equality of all ‘men’, since savages are not ‘men’ in the full 
sense. (Mills 2007, 26–7) 
The wrong of thinking of an indigenous person using the concept SAVAGE is the implication that 
she is less than fully human, or otherwise inferior to members of other races.4 This degradation 
will likely be expressed in racist discriminatory action on the part of the person using the concept 
SAVAGE. But it is plausible that simply thinking those derogatory thoughts is morally problematic. 
As Ernesto Garcia remarks, ‘What seems most truly evil about racist action is not so much any 
particular acts of taunting, racial slurs, or displays of disrespect, but instead…the pernicious 
underlying attitude: that the racist sincerely believes members of a different race somehow count 
as less than human’ (Garcia 2002, 202–3). A closeted racist, who thinks of all indigenous people 
as ‘savages’ but never acts on his disparaging views, would still be doing something morally 
wrong by using that defective concept. 
                                               
4. We might add that SAVAGE is also semantically defective, since it fails to refer (no one is ‘less 
than fully human’), theoretically defective, because assuming there is such a category 
undermines progress in social science, and politically defective, because, as Mills’s passage 
illustrates, it undermines the political value that all people are equal. 
 Another way a concept can be morally defective is because of the harms its use ushers in. 
Of course, not just any harms stemming from the use of a concept would count as morally 
wrong. Thinking of someone who always shies away from standing up for what is right as a 
coward, or thinking of a white supremacist as a racist may bring harm to them, for doing so 
might justify shaming or ostracising them for their actions and views. But such harms would not 
be undeserved. These agents’ morally bad character, actions, and beliefs justify the negative 
evaluation we make of them using the concepts COWARD and RACIST, making the application of 
these concepts apt, and at least some of the harms they thereby experience permissible.5 Thus, 
despite the harm it may produce, using these concepts, in this instance, would not be wrong. 
 By contrast, consider Talia Mae Bettcher’s critique of mainstream sex and gender 
concepts from the perspective of a trans person. On her account, the prevailing forms of the 
concepts MALE and FEMALE or MAN and WOMAN are partially defined in terms of the genitals 
someone has. The content of these concepts thus entails that trans people who have not had sex 
reassignment surgery do not really have the gender with which they identify and, thus, must be 
either ‘pretending’ to have that gender identity, or ‘deceiving’ themselves or others about their 
‘true’ sex or gender. Bettcher argues that this representation of trans people is harmful in two 
ways. First, denying that trans people have the gender with which they identify does 
demonstrable psychological harm, and, moreover, silences trans people’s testimony regarding 
                                               
5. I say ‘at least some of the harms’ and not ‘all’ the harms, because there will be some threshold 
at which the harms that come to the coward or the racist because they are so categorised become 
undeserved. To take an extreme example, it would be impermissible to murder them for their 
cowardice or racism. While it may be true that such extreme harms are produced by the 
application of these concepts, in the sense that the use of these concepts is upstream in the causal 
chain leading to the murder, the fact that this harm is quite beyond what is reasonably permitted 
by identifying someone as a coward or a racist does not, I think, mean that the application of 
those concepts was wrong after all. Rather, the wrong lies in the murderer taking things too far. 
their own experiences: ‘after identity enforcement, nothing we [trans people] might say could 
possibly matter’ (Bettcher 2007, 51). Second, the notion of trans people as ‘pretenders’ and 
‘deceivers’ that follows from these concepts provokes physical violence against trans people 
when the ‘deception’ is revealed: ‘A framework has been deployed whereby transphobic violence 
may be excused or justified on the grounds that deception had been involved’ (ibid.). Trans 
people are subject to these harms not as a permissible response to bad character traits or bad 
actions of theirs, but simply because of their gender identities, and no one ever deserves harm 
simply because of their gender. These harms are thus undeserved, and give us good reason to 
think that the concepts are defective.6 
 It is also worth noting that concepts that are themselves not defective can be misused, 
producing morally problematic effects similar to the above. Consider the misapplication of thick 
concepts—that is to say, concepts that have both descriptive and evaluative aspects, such as 
COURAGEOUS, COWARDLY, KIND, or CRUEL.7 Applying a thick concept to someone involves some 
kind of evaluation of the person, and when that evaluation is unfair, the application of that 
concept might be wrongful. For example, Iris Murdoch describes the case of a mother-in-law, M, 
and her daughter-in-law, D. M was raised in an upper-class household with strong views about 
etiquette, so her initial impression of the lower-class and socially less restrained D is 
                                               
6. To be clear, I do not presume to know which sex and gender conceptions are the ones we 
should be using. But the harms trans people suffer as a result of the widespread use of genitalia-
based sex and gender concepts are grave and systematic enough that any conceptual engineering 
in this area must take trans experiences seriously. 
7. Bernard Williams’s discussion of thick ethical concepts is the locus classicus on this topic 
(Williams 1985), though he acknowledges that the idea has earlier roots in the work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and those inspired by him, particularly Philippa Foot and Iris Murdoch. For a 
contemporary introduction to thick concepts, see Kirchin (2013). 
unfavourable: she thinks of D as vulgar, undignified, noisy, and juvenile. Each of these concepts 
has a negative evaluative aspect; in thinking about D using concepts like VULGAR or JUVENILE, 
M thinks poorly of her daughter-in-law. However, M later subjects her characterisation of D to 
greater scrutiny, bearing in mind that her own elitist upbringing may have distorted her initial 
impressions. Through this reconsideration of the facts, ‘D is discovered to be not vulgar but 
refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile 
but delightfully youthful, and so on’ (Murdoch 2013, 17). Murdoch argues that in coming to 
characterise D in different terms—that is to say, by using different concepts—M corrects a moral 
error: she manages ‘not just to see D accurately but to see her justly or lovingly’ (22).8 In other 
words, it was wrong of M to think of D using those concepts, because they do not fairly apply to 
her. (If this seems difficult to accept, imagine how D, or her husband, might react if they were 
somehow to learn, before M’s reflection, what M really thinks of D. Naturally, they would feel 
insulted, and this implies that they would believe that M has done something wrong.) This need 
not suggest that these concepts are defective—the locus of the moral wrong lies in M’s misuse of 
those concepts in her thinking, not with the concepts themselves. Since the moral problems that 
can arise from concept use are broader than just those that are constituted by or that follow from 
the use of morally defective concepts, an account of conceptual responsibility should also 
capture cases like that of M and D. 
                                               
8. In order to make it clear that the moral improvement here is entirely at the level of M’s 
concepts, Murdoch adds that M’s initial impression of D never showed in her behaviour: ‘the 
mother, who is a very “correct” person, behaves beautifully to the girl throughout, not allowing 
her real opinion to appear in any way...whatever is in question as happening happens entirely in 
M’s mind’ (Murdoch 2013, 17). 
 These examples suggest that the claim that there are morally defective concepts—and, in 
addition, that the misuse of benign concepts can be morally problematic—is true. But to answer 
No Wrong Concepts and establish a place for conceptual responsibility, we have to show how we 
could really be said to be doing something wrong when we use such concepts, if concept use is 
beyond our control. To do so, in the following three sections, I uncover and criticise the theory of 
moral responsibility that underpins No Wrong Concepts, and consider alternative accounts. 
3. Voluntarism 
For an agent to be responsible for something, that thing has to be connected to the agent in the 
appropriate kind of way, and the agent must not be excused from responsibility in some way. The 
classical view of moral responsibility—which I will call voluntarism—holds that the relevant 
connection is voluntary action.9 For an action to be voluntary, it must meet two conditions. First, 
the agent must be in control of that action. Second, the agent must be aware of what she is doing 
in taking that action, and in particular, she must be aware of the moral worth of what she is 
bringing about. To take a fairly simple example, consider the following case: 
Teen Bully. Lina is an 18-year-old delinquent who is mean to just about everyone. She is 
particularly harsh towards Gary, whom she regularly insults and beats up. Lina knows 
that it is wrong for her to be so mean to Gary, especially since Gary considers himself her 
friend. Yet, whenever Gary does something foolish, she ignores her conscience and 
bullies him anyway—after all, she finds it fun to be mean. 
Because Lina is in control of her behaviour and aware that she is acting wrongly, she meets 
voluntarism’s conditions for being responsible for bullying Gary. 
 When one or both of voluntarism’s conditions are not fulfilled, the agent has an excuse 
that absolves her of responsibility. Potential excuses based on the control condition include 
                                               
9. Voluntarism has too many adherents to acknowledge, going back at least to Aristotle (1999, 
especially 1110a–1111b4). 
things like coercion, mind control, extreme duress, or (depending on who you ask) the truth of 
causal determinism. For example, consider the following variant on Teen Bully: 
Bully Puppet. Lina bullies Gary whenever he does something foolish, and she knows that 
this is wrong. But, she is not in control of herself when she does so. An evil sorcerer has 
placed her under a curse, such that whenever Gary acts foolishly, she will be compelled 
to insult Gary and beat him up. Because of the curse’s magic, Lina is completely 
powerless to stop herself from hurting her friend. 
Because Lina is not in control of her behaviour in this modified case, she is excused from being 
responsible for bullying Gary. 
 Potential excuses based on the awareness condition include being unaware of or unable 
to comprehend what one is doing (e.g. a psychotic episode), or ignorance of morally relevant 
non-moral facts (e.g. not knowing that the tea one has served to a friend has been poisoned by a 
maleficent third party). Ignorance of the demands of morality (e.g. an ancient slaveholder who 
does not question the morality of the institution of slavery) may also provide an excuse, but this 
is contentious.10 To take an example of non-moral ignorance, consider the following variant on 
Teen Bully: 
Ignorant Bully. Lina has mended her ways and no longer consciously bullies anyone; 
indeed, she now intervenes to stop bullying whenever she sees it. One day, she happens 
across Gary and an acquaintance of theirs, Raz, who are fighting in an alley. Because 
Gary has the upper hand, Lina assumes that he was the instigator. She breaks up the fight 
by pulling Gary off of Raz, beating him back, and accusing him of having become a bully 
himself. Defeated, Gary apologises. But in fact, Raz was the instigator of the fight: he 
jumped Gary in the dark alley, and Gary was just defending himself. 
Lina’s intervention in the fight was unfair to Gary, and in fact turned into another instance of her 
bullying him, since she browbeat him into apologising for something he did not do. However, 
                                               
10. See Rosen (2003, 2004) for an argument that moral ignorance can excuse wrongdoing. See 
Alvarez and Littlejohn (2017), Harman (2011), and Mason (2015), for arguments against the 
thesis that moral ignorance provides an excuse.  
because she was ignorant of a morally relevant fact—that Gary was defending himself and not 
bullying Raz, as he appeared to be—she fails to meet the awareness condition, and is thereby 
excused. However, if Lina were somehow responsible for her ignorance—if her ignorance were 
the result of a wrongful act she voluntarily committed, say, refusing to listen to Gary’s attempts 
to explain himself as she accosts him—then her ignorance would no longer provide an excuse.11 
 Let’s turn now to the use of concepts. According to voluntarism, in order to be 
responsible for violating a moral standard by using a particular concept, the subject must both be 
in control of the use of that concept in her thinking, and aware it is morally problematic to use 
that concept in this context. These conditions severely constrain the range of cases in which the 
subject is responsible for using concepts in this way. We do sometimes actively choose to think 
using one concept rather than another—to think of something as this rather than that. In 
Murdoch’s story, for example, M might consciously try thinking of D as youthful rather than as 
juvenile, to see if this might be a more accurate, fair, and loving representation. But this 
reflective mode of thinking is not the typical way our concepts are deployed. Usually, when we 
acquire propositional attitudes, the concepts used to construct them are deployed through 
cognitive processes over which we have no direct control. 
 Moreover, just as it is uncommon to deliberately do something one believes to be morally 
wrong, it is rare to select a concept that one believes to be morally problematic.12 Perhaps those 
                                               
11. For more on the voluntarist account of culpable ignorance, see H.M. Smith (1983), 
Zimmerman (1997). 
12. Except, perhaps, when one is being ironic or jocular, or when one is trying to interpret 
someone else’s thoughts or utterances in which a defective concept occurs, or when one is 
otherwise holding the offending representation at a distance. With regard to words, such contexts 
where one merely mentions an offending term are often taken to defuse the moral wrongs that 
typically follow from using the term, and we might want to extend this notion to the level of the 
concepts we employ. But see Langton (2018, 160), who argues that the use/mention distinction 
who take glee in being ‘politically incorrect’ deliberately choose to use concepts like SAVAGE, 
knowing but not caring that it is wrong to dehumanise indigenous people. Similarly, some who 
deliberately apply genitalia-based sex and gender concepts to trans people may be aware that the 
entailed misgendering is undeservedly harmful. And, we might imagine a variation on 
Murdoch’s example where the mother-in-law deliberately continues to think unfairly of her 
daughter-in-law purely out of spite. But these kinds of cases will be uncommon. It seems far 
more likely that the thinkers in these cases would take themselves to be in the right by using 
those concepts in these ways. They would therefore fail to meet the awareness condition, and, 
thus, would not be responsible for using these concepts. Of course, they might well be 
responsible for their ignorance that using these concepts is wrong. For example, the racist’s 
ignorance regarding the wrongfulness of the concept SAVAGE may be due to a voluntary refusal to 
take indigenous perspectives seriously. But it still seems likely that such a refusal would be in 
further ignorance that it would be wrong to take the ignorance-inducing action. The agent would 
thus fail to meet the awareness condition at a higher level, and once again be excused from 
responsibility.13 
 According to voluntarism, the range of cases where we are responsible for using morally 
defective concepts is admittedly rather slim, but it is not empty, as No Wrong Concepts supposes. 
This might suffice to show that these concepts are indeed defective, because to use them 
                                               
does not always work this way—in particular, the ‘injurious illocutionary potential of a slur’ can 
‘leak’ out of the scare quotes one places around it. 
13. This process of having to trace ignorant wrongdoing back through potentially multiple levels 
of ignorant wrongdoing to a clear-eyed wrongful act is the basis of Rosen’s (2003) argument that 
a voluntarist account of culpable ignorance leads to a kind of skepticism about moral 
responsibility. Though I will not take this up here, Rosen’s conclusion seems to me another good 
reason to reject voluntarism in favour of one of the alternative theories I present below. 
voluntarily would be wrong. But this position would still be a disappointing result. It would 
mean that, in the vast majority of cases, we would not be permitted to hold people responsible 
for using morally defective concepts, because, according to voluntarism, we rarely ever are 
responsible for using a particular concept. 
4. Rationalism 
The concern just raised touches on a more general problem for voluntarist accounts of moral 
responsibility, namely, that their central focus on action fails to account for the fact that we often 
hold people responsible for their mental activity, such as their propositional attitudes, what they 
remember or forget, what they notice or neglect, what occurs to them, and their emotional 
reactions. Angela Smith suggests the following example: 
[Birthday.] I forgot a close friend’s birthday last year. A few days after the fact, I realized 
that this important date had come and gone without my so much as sending a card or 
giving her a call. I was mortified. What kind of a friend could forget such a thing? Within 
minutes I was on the phone to her, acknowledging my fault and offering my apologies. 
(A.M. Smith 2005, 236) 
The nature of Smith’s moral fault in this case cannot be captured by voluntarism. She did not  
voluntarily choose to forget this important date, and probably couldn’t have even if she wanted 
to. And yet, Smith continues, ‘there was no doubt in either of our minds that I was, indeed, 
responsible for [forgetting]’ (ibid.). Hence, Smith sought her friend’s forgiveness for the fault.14 
 Noting that we in fact hold people accountable for the wrongs captured by cases like 
Birthday, Smith develops an alternative view of responsibility, which I will call rationalism. On 
Smith’s account, the agent is responsible for behaviour of hers that reflects her evaluative 
                                               
14. Readers unconvinced that forgetting to mark a friend’s birthday is a moral fault may 
substitute their own example where one forgets something important, and thereby does 
something morally wrong—say, forgetting one’s anniversary with one’s spouse, or forgetting 
one’s own child’s birthday. 
outlook, because it is that outlook that supplies the agent’s reasons for what she does. As she puts 
it: ‘an agent is responsible for Φ just in case Φ bears a rational connection to the agent’s 
evaluative judgements’ (A.M. Smith 2012, 577). The relevant notion of an evaluative judgement 
is broad, encompassing what we find true, important, valuable, or good, and going beyond 
consciously held attitudes to implicit and even unrecognised commitments. They are not merely 
one-off assessments, but rather ‘continuing and relatively stable dispositions to respond in 
particular ways to particular situations’ (A.M. Smith 2005, 251, fn. 27), which, ‘taken together, 
make up the basic evaluative framework through which we view the world’ (251). To summarise, 
according to rationalism, the agent is responsible for φ-ing if and only if the agent’s reasons for 
φ-ing stem from the agent’s evaluative outlook. 
 Rationalism captures the same cases as voluntarism, because voluntary action involves 
recognising and choosing to react to the reasons one takes oneself to have for that action, and 
these consciously recognised reasons often stem from one’s evaluative outlook. For example, 
recall Teen Bully. Despite the fact that Lina knows she is doing something wrong when she 
bullies Gary, she may have a reason for doing so that stems from an objectionable part of her 
evaluative outlook, such as a judgement that the fun she gets from exerting her power over Gary 
outweighs the harm she causes him, or a judgement that her friends are not particularly important 
to her. 
 Rationalism also captures the standard kinds of excuses, but instead of appealing to the 
agent’s lack of control over or awareness of what she is doing, the explanation for why she is 
excused points to the absence of rational influence from the agent’s evaluative judgements. In 
Bully Puppet, for example, when Lina is compelled to bully Gary by the sorcerer’s curse, her 
actions do not reflect any of her evaluative judgements; the curse ensures that she acts entirely 
mechanically, without any capacity to respond to her reasons in action. 
 Cases like Ignorant Bully are slightly trickier for rationalism to handle. For it seems that 
regardless of her ignorance that she was doing something bad, Lina’s actions reflect the rational 
influence of her evaluative judgements: in this case, Lina thinks that bullying is wrong and 
should be stopped, and for this reason she intervenes in the fight, unwittingly bullying Gary in 
the process. But here is one way the rationalist can make sense of why ignorance sometimes 
provides an excuse. When the agent is ignorant that she is doing something bad, this ignorance is 
itself something for which she may be responsible. So far, this is the same point about culpable 
ignorance recognised by voluntarism. But, according to rationalism, if the agent is not 
responsible for her ignorance, then ipso facto she is not ignorant because of the influence of any 
of her evaluative judgements. Something other than the agent’s evaluative judgements thus 
accounts for the reason upon which she is now acting, because that reason stems from her 
ignorance, and the reason for her ignorance does not stem from her evaluative judgements. 
Therefore, she would not be responsible for acting badly. 
 In Ignorant Bully, for example, notice that although Lina’s reason for intervening in the 
fight stems most directly from her evaluative judgement that bullying is wrong, this would be no 
reason to intervene had she not believed (falsely) that Gary was bullying Raz. This shows that 
her reason for intervening in the fight also stems from that prior belief. Now suppose that Lina is 
not responsible for being ignorant that Gary was just defending himself. This supposition entails 
that her evaluative judgements had no rational connection to her ignorance. So, her reason for 
intervening in the fight did not ultimately stem from her evaluative judgements after all. 
Therefore, she is excused for unwittingly bullying Gary. 
 Let’s now return to how rationalism handles responsibility for mental activities. Smith’s 
forgetfulness in Birthday can be interpreted as reflecting a judgement on her part that either her 
friend or celebrating birthdays is not particularly important to her. Smith’s self-directed 
question—‘What kind of a friend could forget such a thing?’—can be reformulated to ask for her 
reasons for forgetting—‘Why did I forget her birthday?’—the answer to which points to the 
offending judgement—‘I must not think she is all that important to me!’15 Realising that she is 
responsible for this wrong, Smith then holds herself accountable by repudiating that judgement, 
admonishing herself for her error, and calling her friend to apologise. 
 Rationalism looks promising as a model for conceptual responsibility. Because it is not 
tied to the control condition of voluntarism, the fact that our typical use of concepts is not within 
our control poses no obstacle to the judgement that we may be responsible for using defective 
concepts, or for misusing benign concepts. On this view, what is required to be responsible for 
using a concept is that one’s reason for using that concept stems from one’s evaluative outlook. 
To illustrate, recall the examples I introduced in §2. 
 A subject who thinks of indigenous people as ‘savages’ would be responsible for using 
the concept SAVAGE, on this view, so long as the reason why she uses that concept is provided by 
her evaluative outlook. Suppose she believes some racist stereotypes about indigenous people—
                                               
15. This step of asking for the wrongdoer’s reasons highlights that Smith’s view is part of a 
cluster of closely related theories of responsibility (cf. Oshana 1997, Scanlon 1998, Hieronymi 
2014) that all share a commitment to the idea that, fundamentally, what makes an agent 
responsible for something is that that the agent is answerable for it. That is to say, the agent is 
responsible for something when she is open, at least in principle, to demands that she explain her 
reasons for that thing. Smith’s rationalist account is thus intended to provide the conditions under 
which the agent is open to this kind of demand. It is worth noting, however, that the notion of 
answerability can be accounted for by non-rationalist theories of responsibility. Sher, for 
example, whose view I discuss at length in §5, also refers to the notion of being answerable as 
the ‘root meaning’ of the term ‘responsible’ (Sher 2005, 68). 
she thinks they are simple, violent, and anomic. As such she holds strong negative evaluative 
judgements about them and does not hold that respecting their humanity is important. These 
odious aspects of her outlook on the world would supply ample (bad) reasons for her to use the 
concept SAVAGE in her thoughts about indigenous people. She would thus be responsible for 
using this morally defective concept, and for the wrong she does to indigenous people by 
thinking of them as less than fully human. 
 In Murdoch’s vignette, M’s initially unfair characterisation of D reflects her old-
fashioned and elitist worldview, from the perspective of which D’s behaviour is improper. This 
judgement that behaviours like D’s are improper gives M reason to use concepts like VULGAR 
and JUVENILE in thinking about D. But, as M’s later reflection reveals, these concepts do not 
fairly apply to her daughter-in-law. Having realised this, perhaps M may go on to question those 
areas of her worldview. In any case, because M’s initial commitment to these upper-class ideals 
is the source of her reasons for misapplying these concepts to D, she is responsible for thinking 
wrongly of her daughter-in-law.  
 The case of sex and gender concepts is somewhat more complicated. Unlike SAVAGE, 
which is defective in virtue of its morally objectionable content, concepts like MALE and FEMALE, 
or MAN and WOMAN, defined in terms of a person’s genitalia, do not wear their defects on their 
sleeve. Rather, these widely-used sex and gender concepts produce harm because their content 
entails that trans people do not have the gender with which they identify, which in turn produces 
undeserved harms because this representation implies that trans people are ‘pretenders’ or 
‘deceivers’. In cases where the thinker holds an evaluative judgement that it is important to 
maintain that sex or gender is defined in terms of one’s genitalia, and this judgement supplies the 
thinker’s reason for using these concepts despite (or perhaps because of) these implications, the 
thinker would be responsible for using these concepts and for any undeserved harms to trans 
people thus produced. However, it seems plausible that because many cis people (that is to say, 
people who are not trans) are ignorant regarding trans issues, many will thus not know that these 
concepts have harmful implications. In these cases, they would be responsible for using these 
concepts only if their ignorance is culpable. We may be able to trace their ignorance to a 
problematic evaluative judgement, such as a prejudice against trans people, in which case they 
would still be responsible for the harms produced by their use of these concepts. But in at least 
some cases their ignorance will be innocent, because their ignorance is traceable only to features 
of their situation, such as the paucity of information about trans experiences available in readily 
accessible media, and not to any problematic evaluative judgments. In these cases, their 
ignorance provides an excuse. 
 Finally, because not all of our thoughts reflect our evaluative judgements, sometimes the 
subject may not be responsible for using even a concept as clearly defective as SAVAGE. For 
instance, Smith specifically notes that rationalism rules out responsibility for ‘random thoughts 
and mental images’ that do not reflect one’s evaluative outlook (A.M. Smith 2005, 260). So 
when one has the familiar experience of an unpleasant thought ‘flashing’ across one’s conscious 
mind, one would not be responsible for the use of defective concepts in such thoughts. For 
example, suppose the refrain from ‘Savages’, a song from Disney’s 1995 animated feature 
Pocahontas, just starts playing, unbidden, in your head. Even though those thoughts may be 
constructed with a defective concept, the fact that these are just random thoughts and 
unreflective of any deeper evaluative commitment absolves you of any responsibility. 
5. Psychologism 
We might worry, however, about rationalism’s reliance on evaluative judgements. For if 
behaviour for which we are responsible must be rationally connected to such stable and enduring 
aspects of our evaluative outlook, we would be unable to conclude that we are responsible for 
behaviour that is one-off, incidental, or out of character, no matter how heinous.16 Recall that in 
Birthday, in order to vindicate Smith’s assumption that she was responsible for forgetting her 
friend’s birthday, we had to interpolate a bad evaluative judgement on her part—that she doesn’t 
care enough about her friend, or that she doesn’t think noting birthdays is worthwhile. While 
these interpretations are certainly plausible, it is equally plausible that Smith held no pernicious 
evaluative judgements at all. All of us forget important things from time to time. Sometimes, we 
do things we regret as a result. When this happens, it does not necessarily betray some 
malevolence or lack of concern that is hidden by our ordinary patterns of acceptable behaviour. 
Sometimes, we just screw up—but that does not necessarily shield us from responsibility. 
 This criticism of rationalism is similar to a familiar critique of a Humean view of 
blameworthiness, according to which the agent is to blame for bad actions of hers that stem from 
something ‘durable and constant’ in the agent, namely, her ‘characters and disposition’ (Hume 
1896, 411). Like rationalism, a character-based theory of responsibility delivers unacceptable 
results when good people do bad things. For example, consider the following case: 
Good Teacher’s Bad Day. Sam is an adjunct professor. He is generally a decent person 
and an empathetic, supportive, and encouraging teacher who brings out the best in his 
students. But one day, stressed out by another failed round of applications for a 
permanent job, Sam comes into the classroom in a foul mood. His frustration manifests in 
his actions in class, and at one point he openly derides a question raised by an 
enthusiastic student. 
                                               
16. I thank Miranda Fricker for discussion of this objection to rationalism.  
We might sympathise with Sam—it is easy to act out when one is under stress and feeling 
dejected—but his behaviour is not, by that token, excusable. Yet, neither rationalism nor the 
Humean character-based view would allow us to conclude that Sam is responsible for mocking 
his student, because his reasons for this action did not stem not from a pernicious evaluative 
judgement or bad character trait, but rather, from a transient emotional state. 
 In response to the inadequacy of the Humean view, George Sher develops an alternative 
account. Sher argues that although Hume was wrong to focus on the agent’s vices, he was right 
to ground responsibility in some of the agent’s constitutive psychological traits. Building from 
this, on Sher’s view, the agent is blameworthy for an action when ‘the agent has failed to respond 
to some compelling moral reason for not performing it, and...the agent’s failure to respond to that 
reason can be traced to the interaction of certain features of his situation with some significant 
subset of the desires, beliefs, and dispositions that together make him the person he is’ (Sher 
2005, 57). Because the desires, beliefs, and dispositions that cause the agent to fail to respond to 
the moral reasons he has are the same psychological traits which, taken together, are constitutive 
of who the agent is as a person, the badness of the agent’s act reflects badly on the agent by way 
of those traits. This is so whether or not any particular trait is itself morally condemnable—no 
one element of the complex of the agent’s constitutive psychological traits need be morally bad 
for some combination of them to cause the agent to fail to recognise her reasons against acting 
badly. 
 To illustrate, let’s return to Good Teacher’s Bad Day. Sam, by hypothesis, does not have 
any bad character traits, and, indeed, when it comes to his conduct in the classroom, he has traits 
we would call virtues. But on this particular day, his foul mood interacts with some combination 
of his constitutive psychological traits, causing him to fail to respond to his reasons not to mock 
his student. The relevant traits might be quite fine-grained dispositions, such as a disposition to 
be curt and unfair when under extreme stress. Such a disposition is not obviously a morally bad 
trait, nor does it constitute a (mistaken) evaluative judgement that it would be appropriate to act 
in this way. Still, it is a part of the complex of psychological traits that make Sam who he is, and 
in this instance it causes him to fail to respond to his reasons not to mock his student. So, on 
Sher’s view, Sam would be blameworthy for his bad conduct in the classroom. 
 Sher’s view is intended to make sense of blameworthiness for actions, but it can readily 
be extended to cover responsibility more generally. The first modification to make is to note that 
our constitutive psychological traits do not just cause us to fail to respond to reasons against 
acting; they also cause us to respond to our reasons for acting. Second, recall Smith’s point that 
many of our mental activities—our attitudes, what we notice or neglect, what we remember or 
forget, and so on—can be influenced by the reasons to which our evaluative judgements impel us 
to respond. Add to this Sher’s observation that the full range of our constitutive psychological 
traits, and not just our evaluative judgements, has the potential to exert such rational influence. 
Putting these observations together, it is reasonable to think that the rational influence of our 
constitutive psychological traits also extends to our mental activities. In short, according to my 
proposed view, the agent is responsible for φ-ing if and only if the agent φ’d in responding or 
failing to respond to reasons she had for or against φ-ing, where the agent’s response (or lack 
thereof) to these reasons can be traced to the interaction of certain features of the agent’s 
situation with some significant subset of the desires, beliefs, and dispositions that together make 
her the person she is. This account, which I call psychologism, includes Sher’s account of 
responsibility for actions, but is generalised to capture responsibility for mental activities as 
well.17 
 To illustrate, recall our earlier examples. In Teen Bully, Lina would be responsible for 
bullying Gary because her failure to respond to her reasons not to do so can be traced to her 
general disposition to be mean to others. In Bully Puppet, she would be excused because the 
sorcerer’s curse has disabled her ability to respond to reasons at all whenever Gary does 
something foolish, and therefore, her failure to respond to her reasons not to bully Gary cannot 
be traced to any of her constitutive psychological traits. Finally, in Ignorant Bully, Lina’s failure 
to respond to her reasons not to bully Gary is due to her ignorance that Gary was defending 
himself from Raz’s attack. If her ignorance, in turn, can be traced to some combination of her 
constitutive psychological traits, then she would be responsible for her ignorance, and therefore 
responsible for unwittingly bullying Gary. But if not, her ignorance would excuse her.18 
 With respect to Smith’s forgetfulness in Birthday, some of the following psychological 
traits might explain her failure to respond to her reasons for remembering her friend’s birthday: a 
disposition to not to remember dates, a desire not to make phone calls, a fine-grained disposition 
to turn inward and ignore others when (say) under stress, and so on. These psychological traits, 
supposing she has any of them, are parts of the complex that make her the person she is, and 
                                               
17. I became aware, late in the writing of this paper, that Sher would likely resist this 
development of his account, as he has recently argued against the extension of morality into our 
‘private thoughts’ (Sher forthcoming). I lack the space to engage fully with his arguments here, 
but I think my discussion of wrongful concepts in §2 might go some way to answering Sher’s 
objections. 
18. This description roughly follows Sher’s own account of culpable ignorance, which see (Sher 
2009, especially 85ff.). 
cause her to fail to respond to her reasons for remembering her friend’s birthday. So, according 
to psychologism, she would be responsible for forgetting her friend’s birthday. 
 Before applying psychologism to concept use, it is worth considering an objection to the 
view. As Smith argues in a commentary on Sher’s account: ‘some sort of story has to be told 
about where the activity of the agent enters into this picture’ (A.M. Smith 2008, 34, my 
emphasis), for it is such activity that explains what the view has to do with the agent’s agency.19 
According to voluntarism, the agent’s activity comes in via her voluntary choices. According to 
rationalism, the involvement of the agent’s capacity of judgement implies some degree of 
activity, however non-voluntary, on the agent’s part (A.M. Smith, 2005, 263). Where is the 
agent’s activity on Sher’s account, and on the view I have developed from it? 
 My response to this objection is that something very much like judgement, in Smith’s 
sense, is involved whenever psychologism says that the agent is responsible for something. 
Recall that, according to Sher and to psychologism, the agent’s constitutive psychological traits 
influence the agent’s actions by way of the reasons to which they cause her to (fail to) respond. 
And reasons-responsiveness, like judgement, involves some activity on the part of the agent, 
however non-voluntary. The connection between the agent’s constitutive psychological traits and 
what she does is thus not merely causal, in a purely mechanical kind of way, nor is the agent 
entirely passive with regard to this process. The agent’s activity is involved because traits that 
are constitutive of her are what accounts for her reasons-responsiveness when she meets 
psychologism’s conditions for being responsible for something. 
                                               
19. I am grateful to Phyllis Pearson for pushing me to respond to this objection in a commentary 
she delivered on a related paper at the 2019 Congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association. 
 Finally, let’s return to the examples of concept use. When the racist uses the concept 
SAVAGE in her thoughts about indigenous people, she fails to respond to reasons she has against 
using this concept—e.g. that it is dehumanising—because of one or more of her constitutive 
psychological traits—e.g. her factually and morally wrong beliefs about indigenous people. So, 
according to psychologism, she is responsible for using this concept. 
 When M misapplies concepts including VULGAR and JUVENILE to her daughter-in-law, she 
fails to respond to reasons she has against using these concepts in her thoughts about D—reasons 
that, upon reflection, she later recognises—because of one or more of her constitutive 
psychological traits—namely, her (at that point) uncritically endorsed upper-class ideals. So, 
according to psychologism, she is responsible for thinking of D using those concepts. 
 When the agent fails to respond to her reasons not to use genitalia-based sex and gender 
concepts—namely, because they can produce undeserved harms to trans people—and this failure 
is due to some of her constitutive psychological traits—such as a belief that genitalia-based sex 
and gender concepts should be retained despite these harms—the agent would, according to 
psychologism, be responsible for using those concepts. But, if the agent’s failure to respond to 
those reasons was due to non-culpable ignorance of the harms these concepts can cause—i.e. 
ignorance that is not itself traceable to the agent’s constitutive psychological traits—then the 
agent would be excused. 
 Lastly, when the agent has random thoughts that are constructed with defective 
concepts—such as when the refrain from the Pocahontas song starts playing in her mind—the 
agent would not be responsible for using these concepts, because these thoughts do not result 
from her failure to respond to a moral reason that was caused by her beliefs, desires or 
dispositions. Rather, the source of these thoughts is something sub-personal, mere mental 
‘noise’. Such thoughts are not traceable to a failure to respond to reasons due to our constitutive 
psychological traits, but rather to processes in our unconscious minds that are not reasons-
responsive at all. 
6. Bad Conceptual Luck 
While I argued in favour of psychologism on independent grounds, the upshot of the previous 
three sections is that we can find at least some cases, on each of the theories of responsibility that 
I presented, where the agent is responsible for using a concept. The claim that the agent does 
something wrong when she uses a defective concept is therefore vindicated, and No Wrong 
Concepts appears vanquished. 
 However, there remains a pressing objection to be addressed, which threatens to resurrect 
the conclusion of No Wrong Concepts. This objection concerns the role of bad luck in the 
formation of our conceptual repertoires. We acquire many, if not most, of the concepts we use via 
processes for which we are not responsible: our upbringing and early education, our acquisition 
of a natural language, our exposure to the surrounding culture. Even in cases where the agent 
otherwise meets the conditions of responsibility for using a concept, we might think that when 
the ultimate explanation for why she uses that concept is a matter of luck, she cannot fairly be 
held accountable for violating standards by using that concept.20 
 I have two responses to this objection. The first is that we in fact find many cases where 
holding someone accountable for violating a moral standard is warranted, even when the agent’s 
behaviour can be significantly attributed to bad luck. Consider the morally vicious. Suppose that 
                                               
20. The problem of moral luck was introduced to contemporary philosophy in a pair of papers by 
Thomas Nagel (1979) and Bernard Williams (1981). I thank Miranda Fricker and Paul Faulkner 
for discussion of the luck objection. 
Ivy Narcissa is the daughter of a multimillionaire, who raises her such that she develops multiple 
moral vices: arrogance, greed, and selfishness. Ivy’s character development was thus largely a 
matter of luck, and not her own agency. Yet, she still seems open to criticism for her vices. 
Perhaps we would hesitate to blame her particularly harshly given the circumstances of her 
upbringing, but that should not make her immune to being called out in some way. Furthermore, 
the fact that Ivy’s acquisition of these bad traits was largely a matter of luck does not shield her 
from being held accountable for bad actions she takes because her vices cause her to consistently 
fail to respond to certain moral reasons. Suppose Ivy attends a gala instead of visiting her sick 
friend in the hospital. Her friend would be right to criticise Ivy not just for her selfishness, but 
also for her selfish act, even though the ultimate explanation for her behaviour is the way she 
was raised. 
 In short, we hold people accountable for their vices and for the bad actions they take 
because of these traits, despite the their having these traits being largely a matter of luck. And so, 
the fact that our conceptual repertoires are also largely a matter of luck should present no 
obstacle to conceptual accountability. An agent who, for example, learned to use racist concepts 
such as SAVAGE because of the culture in which she was raised would still be accountable for 
violating moral standards by using this concept, when she meets the conditions for being 
responsible for her use of the concept. 
 Still, philosophers who resist the idea that bad luck could have any role in an account of 
responsibility (apart from serving as an excuse) may be unconvinced. Another approach—and 
this is my second answer to the objection—is to concede that we are not responsible when the 
ultimate explanation of our bad thoughts and actions is luck, while at the same time pointing out 
that we usually think we should take responsibility for these outcomes. Multiple philosophers 
have defended this general approach. With regard to moral vices, Andrew Eshleman argues that 
we may not be responsible for acquiring these traits, but we should still take responsibility for 
them (Eshleman 2004). Susan Wolf has argued that a disposition to take responsibility for 
unlucky harmful outcomes of our actions is an ‘unnamed’ moral virtue (Wolf 2001). David 
Enoch goes further, suggesting that we have a moral duty to take responsibility for things 
connected to our identities but for which we are not responsible, such as the bad behaviour of our 
governments or close relatives (Enoch 2012). Finally, Iris Marion Young argues that even though 
we are usually not to blame for the unjust social structures in which our everyday and 
unobjectionable behaviour makes us complicit, we should all take responsibility these injustices 
insofar as we are able (Young 2011). 
 Well and good, but what, practically speaking, is meant by ‘taking responsibility’ for 
something? The kinds of actions involved depend on what one is taking responsibility for. They 
might include apologising, undertaking a project of self-improvement, revising one’s beliefs, 
assuming obligations to make amends for the outcome, or participating in political action. And, 
since we should take responsibility in these cases, it is plausible that others may press us to do so 
by reminding us of this requirement. In a sense, then, we may still hold people accountable in 
cases of bad luck, by urging them to take the actions that constitute taking responsibility.  
 Engaging in conceptual engineering can be viewed as a way of taking responsibility for 
our concepts. Critiquing our concepts for being morally defective, and developing revised or 
entirely new concepts that better serve our purposes, can and should go on even when we are not 
responsible for using them due to bad luck. As John McDowell argues, we have a ‘standing 
obligation’ to reflect critically upon our concepts, and so we must have ‘a standing willingness to 
refashion concepts and conceptions if that is what reflection recommends’ (McDowell 1996, 12–
13). Even if the fact that our conceptual repertoires are largely a matter of luck means that we are 
not responsible for using them, we should still hold ourselves and others accountable for our 
concepts by taking responsibility for them, and demanding that others do the same.  
7. Conclusion: Conceptual Accountability 
We have now seen how we can answer No Wrong Concepts and establish the place of conceptual 
responsibility. On each of the theories of responsibility that I presented—voluntarism, 
rationalism, and psychologism—there is space to recognise that we may be responsible for using 
or misusing concepts. And, even if the fact that our conceptual repertoires are largely a matter of 
luck undermines this conclusion, we would still be required to take responsibility for our 
concepts. What remains to be said is what comes next: how should we hold one another to 
account for the concepts we use? By way of conclusion, I want to offer a sketch of conceptual 
accountability. 
 Moral philosophers often discuss moral accountability in terms of blaming, resenting, and 
punishing wrongdoers for their transgressions. These reactions serve not merely as catharsis for 
the blamer or deterrent for potential wrongdoers, but also to make the wrongdoer feel bad about 
what they have done, so that they recognise that they have acted wrongly. In other words, all 
blame implicitly or explicitly expresses some criticism of the wrongdoer. The most direct way to 
express this criticism would be through a speech act—e.g. ‘How could you think that was 
OK?’—but it can also be expressed non-verbally—e.g. storming out of the room, away from the 
wrongdoer.21 When the agent is morally responsible for doing something wrong, she is open, in 
                                               
21. This sketch of blame is heavily influenced by Miranda Fricker’s account of what she calls 
‘communicative blame’, which on her view is the paradigm for all forms of blame (Fricker 
2016). 
principle, to being held accountable via these expressions of blame. Since, as we have seen, the 
agent is sometimes morally responsible for using or misusing concepts, it follows that, in these 
cases, the agent is open to blame and criticism for her concept use. 
 But recall that many of our concepts have defects that are not moral, but cognitive, 
theoretical, or semantic. While it is possible that using a concept with one of these kinds of 
defects would violate a moral standard—a bad theory can lead to harm in application—in many 
cases this will not hold—a person who conceives of the process of combustion using the concept 
PHLOGISTON may be seriously mistaken, but their use of this concept is probably harmless. In 
such cases, the agent who uses a cognitively, theoretically, or semantically defective concept 
would not be open to (moral) blame for doing so. Would we, then, not be permitted to hold 
people accountable for using such concepts? 
 There are difficult issues here regarding responsibility in domains other than the moral. 
While it is plausible that some version of the different theories of responsibility discussed earlier 
might be adapted to handle these cases, a full treatment must wait for another occasion.22 For the 
moment it suffices to point out that we do, in fact, criticise mistakes in the cognitive, theoretical, 
or semantic domains. Fallacious reasoning, unjustified beliefs, flawed theories, and the use of 
nonsense terms all draw criticism that, like blame, aims to bring the person who made the 
mistake to recognise and correct the error. Sometimes, we even feel justified in resenting people 
                                               
22. There have been several recent attempts to adapt theories of moral responsibility into the 
epistemic domain, which we might be able to employ with regard to responsibility for using 
cognitively, theoretically, or semantically defective concepts. Rettler (2018) argues for an 
account of doxastic responsibility based on a kind of indirect voluntary control over our beliefs. 
Hieronymi (2008) develops an account of responsibility for believing that is similar to 
rationalism. Some aspects of Sher’s (2009) account of culpable ignorance might be extended to 
provide an account of responsibility for beliefs; Brown (forthcoming) modifies Sher’s (2005) 
account of the nature of moral blame to provide an account of epistemic blame. 
for their mistakes in these domains. So, a familiar way of holding people accountable is available 
to deploy when people use cognitively, theoretically, or semantically defective concepts. 
 By identifying and correcting defects in our concepts, conceptual engineering shows us 
where we need to hold each other and ourselves accountable in our thinking. But we cannot 
overlook conceptual engineers themselves—for conceptual engineering can be put to bad use, by 
philosophers or others. Just as concepts may be ameliorated to serve the aims of social justice or 
theoretical progress, much the same methods may be deployed to engineer concepts that are 
defective by design. We need only consider the concepts that extremist groups develop and 
modify to serve their ends, such as white supremacist conceptual inventions like RACE TRAITOR 
(a person who fraternises with people of a different race),23 or terrorist distortions of traditional 
religious concepts like SHAHID (a kind of martyr in Islamic thought).24 Conceptual accountability 
is not just concerned with the ethics of concept use. It must form part of the basis of a kind of 
applied ethics for conceptual engineering itself. 
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